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Shareholders and employees: rent transfer and rent sharing in 
corporate takeovers 
1.1 Introduction  
1.1.1 Research motivation  
The introduction of the ideology of maximising shareholder value and the rise of institutional 
investors in LMEs contributed to the development of an active MCC, which threatens managers 
with replacement if they do not act in the best interests of shareholders. However, some authors 
argue that restructuring for shareholder value through the MCC may negatively affect labour 
(Froud et al., 2000; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). It is suggested that such corporate 
governance practices may discourage employees from investing in firm-specific human capital 
and may pressurise managers into taking short-term profit-maximising actions instead of 
investing in long-term sustainable projects (Blair, 1995).  
Specifically, it is suggested that ownership change through corporate takeovers facilitates 
wealth transfer from employees to shareholders by allowing acquirers to renege on intrinsic 
contracts with employees, such as promises of extra-marginal wage payments (Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988). These renegotiations may result in more favourable value redistribution for 
shareholders. In expectation of the advantages of this bargaining process, acquiring firm 
managers pay high premiums, leading to a significant rise in share prices. In short, this value-
redistribution theory suggests that takeovers may be undertaken with the purpose of rent transfer 
from employees to shareholders. This implies that post-takeover employee welfare should be 
inversely related to shareholder gains earned at the time of the takeover announcement.  
Alternatively, the value-creation theory of takeovers suggests that shareholder gains come from 
expected efficiency improvements arising as a result of shifting target firm assets to more 
3 
efficient users (Manne, 1965)
1
. Under this theory, post-takeover workforce and wage changes 
should depend on the success of mergers, which may be characterised by successful integration, 
higher profitability and better business opportunities. Such positive changes in firm performance 
should be incorporated into acquirers’ share price post-merger. Such efficiency improvements 
should also benefit employees (Holmstrom, 1988; Conyon et al., 2004). In short, takeovers may 
be undertaken with the purpose of improving the welfare of all stakeholders, leading to rent 
sharing between them. This implies that post-takeover changes in labour welfare should depend 
on the success of mergers, where the success could be measured by acquiring firm shareholders’ 
long-run abnormal returns.  
Despite extensive research on the effect of takeovers on shareholder value and employee 
wealth, the question of whether there is any association between these two variables remains 
unanswered. There is little prior empirical evidence which directly tests this association. At the 
same time, this small body of literature provides mixed conclusions on the validity of the rent 
transfer argument: there is empirical evidence both rejecting and supporting the rent transfer 
hypothesis (Rosett, 1990; Gokhale et al., 1993; Becker, 1995; Beckmann and Forbes, 2004).  
To assess these competing hypotheses one needs to analyse the changes in both owners’ and 
employees’ wealth around the time of takeover announcements and then test the relationship 
between these variables. We consider changes in two sets of owners: target firms’ short-run 
abnormal returns surrounding the takeover announcement and acquiring firms’ long-run 
                                                 
1
 As outsiders’ cash flow expectation from using target assets is higher than the cash flow 
expectation of incumbent managers, their valuation of these assets is higher than the incumbent’s 
valuation. This higher valuation enables outsiders to make a higher bid. This higher bid (or 
expectation of such a bid) causes an increase in the market value of the target shares. 
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abnormal returns as possible explanations of post-takeover changes in labour welfare
2
. We 
measure the impact of takeovers on labour using changes in two items of labour data: number of 
workers and their annual wages.  
In addition to the full sample analysis, we measure the shareholder wealth effect of 
takeovers in the WFR and WFG sub-samples
3
. According to the value-redistribution theory, the 
WFR sub-sample shareholders should earn higher abnormal returns than the WFG sub-sample 
shareholders. To test these predictions, first, we compare short-run shareholder abnormal returns 
for the WFR and WFG sub-samples. Furthermore, wage growth should depend on target firm 
shareholder gains. To test this prediction, we regress post-takeover employment and wage 
changes on target firm shareholders’ gains.  
According to the value-creation theory, the WFG sub-sample shareholders should earn 
higher long-run abnormal returns than the WFR sub-sample shareholders. Therefore we compare 
long-run share price abnormal returns of acquiring firms for WFG and WFR sub-samples. 
Furthermore, workforce and wage growth should depend on the value created by mergers, which 
could be measured with the acquirers’ long-run abnormal returns. Therefore we investigate 
whether post-takeover long-run abnormal returns are associated with the changes in workforce 
and wages by regressing long-run abnormal returns on employment and wage growth. 
1.1.2 Brief results and contributions 
We find that around takeover announcements the WFR sub-sample shareholders earn lower 
abnormal returns than the WFG sub-sample shareholders. This contradicts the predictions of the 
                                                 
2
 After mergers some target firm shareholders may become shareholders of acquiring firm, if 
payment was in the form of stock.  
3
 The WFR and WFG sub-samples are explained in the chapter 5.   
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rent transfer argument. Interestingly, the WFR sub-sample acquirers lose significantly, while the 
WFG acquirers’ wealth does not change much. Similarly, in the long run the WFR sub-sample 
acquirers earn significant negative abnormal returns, while the WFG sub-sample acquirers’ 
performance does not differ from the performance of non-merging control firms.   
Furthermore, the regressions show a positive association between target shareholders’ abnormal 
returns and workforce growth, while the premium is positively associated with wage growth. 
Only in cash-financed acquisitions are higher abnormal returns associated with lower wage 
growth, while in hostile takeovers a higher premium is associated with lower wage growth. 
Similarly, in related acquisitions a high premium leads to slower employment growth.     
In contrast, the results support the rent-sharing argument: there is significant positive 
association between shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns and post-takeover changes in both 
workforce and wage, meaning that in acquisitions with low shareholder returns, wage and 
employment growth is also low. Thus, we conclude that in corporate takeovers employee wealth 
concessions do not depend on the rent expropriating behaviour of shareholders, but post-takeover 
jobs and wages depend on the value created by takeovers; if shareholders gain from takeovers, 
then employees also benefit from such transactions; if shareholders lose from the acquisitions, 
then employees also suffer from them.  
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides new evidence on the 
relationship between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions around takeover 
transactions. Although there is well established research on the shareholder wealth effect of 
takeovers on the one hand, and the effect of takeovers on labour on the other hand, the research 
on the direct relationship between these two effects of takeovers is limited to a few papers only 
(discussed in the next section). 
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Secondly, the chapter clarifies takeover motivations and sources of gains arising from 
such transactions. The value-redistribution theory suggests rent transfer from other stakeholders 
to shareholders as a source of takeover gains. Alternatively, the value-creation theory suggests 
efficiency improvements as a source of takeover gains. So empirical evidence on these two 
competing theories clarifies the issues related with the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices in LMEs. 
Shareholder gains around takeover announcements are well documented: in the short run 
target shareholders earn significant abnormal returns, while bidder shareholders’ wealth does not 
change much.  At the same time there is growing evidence showing that in the long run acquiring 
firm shareholders lose significantly. However, the sources of these gains are controversial and, 
more importantly, the reasons for the long-run stock price underperformance, termed as the ‘post-
takeover performance puzzle’ in corporate finance, is unknown. In short, the question of how 
takeovers create or destroy shareholder value is still unanswered. Therefore the results of this 
chapter also clarify the matter of whether acquirers’ underperformance could be related to the 
changes in employment and wages. 
1.2 Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
1.2.1 Target shareholders’ gains and post-takeover changes in employee wealth 
It is suggested that market mechanisms such as the ‘exit’ strategy, used in LMEs to discipline 
managers, excessively pressurise them into maximising shareholder value. As a result, managers 
may take actions to increase shareholder value at the expense of other stakeholders. Specifically, 
ownership change may also lead to a change in management control, where new management 
may not be responsible for adhering to the implicit contracts between incumbent management 
and employees. Being themselves under market pressure, new management have incentives to 
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breach those implicit contracts and renegotiate them in favour of shareholders. On the basis of 
this Shleifer and Summers (1988) suggest that gains to target shareholders at least partially come 
at the expense of labour, in the form of job losses, wage cuts and other forms of rent reductions 
for employees. Under the ‘nexus of contracts’ view of the firm, long-term contracts between 
shareholders and employees could be implicit, providing a trust-based framework to employees 
for investing firm-specific capital. Although ex ante such contracts are valuable for both 
shareholders and employees, ex post shareholders may derive some benefit from reneging on 
such contracts by firing more senior workers, whose wage exceeds their marginal product and 
who were underpaid when they were young. As these implicit contract holders are mainly 
incumbent managers, shareholders can breach these contracts by replacing the incumbent 
management through ownership change. Chemla (2005) suggests that even friendly mergers may 
involve breach of trust between shareholders and other stakeholders, and hence the existence of a 
takeover threat reduces the ex-ante investments of other stakeholders. Therefore all takeovers 
may affect long-term labour relations.       
In such cases, incumbent management and workers form alliances against shareholders. 
Hellwig (2000) argues that incumbent management and workers are natural allies against non-
controlling shareholders and therefore they have incentives to make implicit contracts. Pagano 
and Volpin (2005) develop a model formally showing that managers and employees have 
incentives to make alliances against shareholders. Managers transform employees into anti-
takeover defence mechanisms by offering them long-term employment contracts, paying high 
wages and not monitoring too strictly, when they have small ownership stakes. The reason for 
such a coalition is that managers value the private benefits of a ‘quiet life’, while employees fight 
hostile takeovers to protect their long-term contracts and high salaries. Thus, a generous 
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employment policy can serve as an entrenchment instrument for the incumbent management and 
it may be preferable for shareholders to discipline such behaviour through ‘exit’.    
At the same time, many other authors argue that acquiring firm managers pay high 
premiums to target shareholders and subsequently cover these by cutting labour costs (Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997; Sirower, 2000). This also suggests post-takeover employee layoffs, induced 
by target firm shareholders’ gains in the form of a takeover premium (Krishnan et al., 2007).  
The empirical tests of the value-redistribution theory include analysing union wealth change, 
wage growth or labour demand adjustments after takeovers. Some authors have provided at least 
partial support for the rent transfer argument. Becker (1995) finds that the mean difference in 
target shareholder returns for unionised and non-unionised firms was statistically significant and 
economically large. Shareholder returns in unionized target firms were 14-16% larger than 
average target shareholder returns of 37%, supporting the rent expropriation theory. Rosett 
(1990) provides evidence showing that 10% (5%) of shareholder gains in hostile (friendly) 
takeovers could come from labour losses over a period of 18 years after takeovers. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1990) estimate that workforce growth in ownership-changing auxiliary (production) 
units is 17% (4.5%) lower than in non-ownership-changing units. However, Brown and Medoff 
(1988) report a 5% increase in employment, while McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) report an 
insignificant 3% growth in employment. 
The results of Gokhale et al. (1993) suggest that hostile takeovers reduce employment for 
more senior workers than other workers. Bhagat et al. (1990) find that in 28 of 62 hostile 
takeover cases on average 5.7% of workers were laid off, which provided cost savings to cover 
only 10-20% of the takeover premium. Using a small UK sample, but adjusting for the effect of 
relevant asset divestments, Beckmann and Forbes (2004) report an 11% employment decline 
during the five years post-takeover. Gugler and Yurtoglu’s (2004) results reveal that US tender 
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offer takeovers reduce employment by 8%, while other takeovers do not change employment 
levels. Therefore these authors interpret this as being consistent with the rent transfer hypotheses 
as tender offers can be assumed to cause a larger element of hostility than other takeovers. 
However, interestingly, their results show that UK tender offer takeovers do not significantly 
change employment levels, while other deals reduce employment by 14%. In short, according to 
the rent transfer hypothesis, post-takeover workforce changes are predicted to be an inverse 
function of target firm shareholders’ gains (share price abnormal returns or bid premium): 
Q3-H1: Target firm shareholders’ short-run abnormal returns surrounding takeover 
announcements are negatively associated with post-takeover workforce growth. 
Q3-H2: The takeover premiums paid to target firm shareholders are negatively associated with 
post-takeover workforce growth. 
In addition to employee layoffs, the rent transfer could also involve slower wage growth and cuts 
in other rents to workers. Several empirical studies report that unexplained extra-marginal wage 
differentials exist even amongst firms within the same industries with similar financial indicators 
(Krueger and Summers, 1988). Lazear (1979) suggests that it is preferable for both firms and 
workers to agree to a long-term wage stream that pays workers less than the value of their 
marginal product when they are young and more than the value of their marginal product when 
they are older. Such an extra-marginal wage provides long-term incentives, urging workers to 
make firm- specific human capital investment. However, it may be beneficial for shareholders to 
reverse such payments through ownership change that facilitates the renegotiation of such extra-
marginal wage payments. 
As discussed above, the Pagano and Volpin (2005) model predicts that incumbent 
managers have incentives to pay higher wages to protect the private benefits of their own ‘quiet 
life’. In contrast, post-takeover new managers have incentives to cut wages as much as possible 
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and to introduce more intensive monitoring of workers to maximise takeover gains. Their model 
predicts that such wage cuts cause an increase in the company’s share price in proportion to the 
share of the total wage bill that is paid to employees with renegotiable contracts. 
Gokhale et al. (1993) analyse extra-marginal wage payments to workers in the form of employer-
specific wage differentials and steeper-than-average seniority wage payments. Analysing the pre-
event characteristics of hostile takeover targets and the probability of subsequent hostile 
takeovers, they could not find any significant relationship between these two variables. The 
Gokhale et al. (1993) results reveal that senior employees’ wage profiles flatten for firms with an 
initially high concentration of senior workers, indicating the wealth expropriation after such 
takeovers. Neumark and Sharpe (1996) argue that if the highest wage premia and the steepest 
wage profiles for more-tenured workers reflect extra-marginal wage payments, then hostile 
takeovers should target firms with these characteristics. However, logistic regressions do not 
show that the likelihood of being a hostile takeover target is related to such characteristics. 
However, only one UK study in this area – that of Beckmann and Forbes (2004) - reports 
that wage growth is also higher than a benchmark wage growth
4
. In their study the regressions of 
bid premiums on job cuts and wages indicate no significant association between these variables.  
In brief, many authors agree that a substantial part of shareholder gains results from employee 
losses. For example, Pontiff et al. (1990) report that pension fund revisions are higher after 
hostile takeovers (15%) than after friendly takeovers (8%), consisting of on average 11% of 
target shareholders’ takeover announcement gains. Takeover gains could come in the form of 
wage cuts (covering 10% of gains, as reported by Rosett (1990)), pension fund revisions 
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 Beckmann and Forbes (2004) estimate the wage growth benchmarks on the basis of pre-
takeover historic wage growth and industry average wage growth. 
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(covering 15% of gains, as reported by Pontiff et al. (1990))
5
 and employee layoffs (covering 10-
20% of gains, as reported by Bhagat et al. (1990)). On the basis of this discussion, the following 
hypotheses will be tested:  
Q3-H3: Target firm shareholders’ short-run abnormal returns surrounding takeover 
announcements are negatively associated with post-takeover wage growth. 
Q3-H4: The takeover premiums paid to target firm shareholders are negatively associated with 
post-takeover wage growth. 
1.2.2 Acquirer shareholders’ gains and post-takeover changes in employee wealth  
As discussed above, a strand of literature suggests that in LMEs managers shift risks onto labour 
during hard times (Froud et al., 2000; Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). According to this view 
managerial actions will be dictated by the market and managers under market pressure favour 
shareholders’ interests over labour interests. However, a recently emerging strand of literature 
argues that such a view does not fully represent the reality of labour management (Deakin, 2005). 
Gospel and Pendleton (2003) and Pendleton (2009) argue that the existing evidence does not 
support the above hypothesized negative effect on labour of restructuring for shareholder value. 
Instead the labour management practice in the publicly listed firms in LMEs could also be 
considered as more favourable towards labour and Pendleton (2009) discusses several reasons for 
a such management style. Institutional investors have started to use relational forms of 
governance rather than market forms of governance as the latter is becoming more costly. This 
gives managers a greater degree of ‘strategic choice’ and autonomy from shareholders in 
decision-making. At the same time, corporate law requires managers to exercise independent 
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 However, Pontiff et al. (1990) report that this type of rent cut occurs only in about 10% of cases 
of takeovers.  
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judgement and to promote the success of the company, balancing the interests of all stakeholders 
involved, including shareholders and employees.  
On the basis of this it can be argued that wages and workforce growth depend on the 
value created by takeovers. In other words, post-takeover employee wealth concessions should be 
determined by a successful outcome of business integration process that enhances firm 
profitability and creates new growth opportunities. Such changes should alter post-takeover 
operating performance and gradually raise the share price of acquiring firms. Thus, one of the 
measures of merger success is the acquiring firms’ long-run stock price abnormal returns. 
Workforce reductions may occur after unsuccessful takeovers, resulting from poor acquisition 
strategy, mis-match of acquired and acquiring business or failure of business integration. In 
contrast, only those acquisitions that create high business growth opportunities may benefit 
workers with new jobs and accelerated wage growth. Therefore we argue that success of mergers 
is measured by acquirers’ long-run abnormal returns. Furthermore, post-takeover wage and 
employment growth should be associated with acquirers’ long-run abnormal returns. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, the WFR sub-sample acquirers’ abnormal returns should be more negative 
than WFG sub-sample acquirers’ abnormal returns. 
There may be several reasons for faster wage growth during a post-merger period. First, 
workers may earn higher wages as a result of changes in the wage setting process and a post-
merger profitability increase. Conyon et al. (2004) report that both profitability and wages rise 
following mergers, where related acquisitions increase wages faster than unrelated acquisitions 
due to increased efficiency in labour usage. Alternatively, managers may become more 
entrenched after mergers, having more control rights. Cronqvist  et al. (2009) show that managers 
with more control pay their workers more. While wage cuts are expected after hostile takeovers 
involving management turnover, it is reasonable to expect wage growth after friendly takeovers. 
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The reason is that managers may prefer a ‘quiet life’, as discussed in Pagano and Volpin (2005) 
and Pendleton (2009). Previously Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) showed that when the 
takeover threat is weak, managers pay high wages. Mergers enlarge firms, making them less 
vulnerable to takeover threats. As a result managers of such firms become more entrenched and 
start paying higher wages. Pendleton (2009) also suggests that the high visibility of publicly 
listed companies may encourage managers to adopt a more labour friendly management style in 
such companies.   
A growing number of empirical studies provide evidence showing that takeovers are 
value enhancing transactions, benefiting both shareholders and employees. Some of the value 
enhancements come in the form of economies of scale through decline in labour demand. The 
Conyon et al. (2002, 2004) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) results indicate that during the first 
two post-takeover years labour demand declines by about 12-20%. This decline in labour demand 
is interpreted as evidence of efficiency improvement and significant rationalisations in labour 
use. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) report that after adopting anti-takeover laws, the total 
factor of productivity and profitability declines. At the same time, worker wages, especially 
wages of ‘white-collar’ workers rise after the adoption of anti-takeover rules. Therefore the 
authors conclude that takeovers do not involve rent transfer to shareholders, but improve 
economic performance through management disciplining. On the basis of this discussion, the 
following hypotheses will be tested:   
 
Q3-H5: Acquiring firm shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns are positively associated with 
post-takeover workforce changes. 
Q3-H6: Acquiring firm shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns are positively associated with 
post-takeover wage growth. 
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1.3 Data and methodology 
1.3.1 Econometric modelling 
To test hypotheses Q2-H1 and Q2-H3, we estimate the following model:  
  ControlCARX T1         (1) 
where X is either the change in the logarithm of number of employees from t-1 to t+3 in the 
employment equation or the change in the logarithm of average wages per employee per annum 
in the wage equation. The number of employees represents the average number of both full- and 
part-time employees during the relevant year. Wages represent annual staff costs paid to all 
employees and directors of the firms
6
, scaled by the number of employees. It includes wages and 
salaries, social security costs and other pension costs
7
. TCAR is the target firm shareholders’ 
short-run abnormal returns around takeover announcement, and   is the error term. Control 
variables include: 
- Change in acquirers’ operating performance, measured as change in the ratio of EBITDA to 
Total Assets (hereafter ROA);  
                                                 
6
 The most direct test of the rent transfer hypothesis should be undertaken on the basis of the 
analysis of individual worker wages in both target and acquiring firms, using employee-employer 
linked data. However, we do not have such a dataset and therefore we use information on firm 
level staff costs, obtained from Datastream. Firm level staff cost data represents wages paid to all 
employees and officers of the firm. It also includes other employee benefits such as insurance and 
contributions to pension plans.   
7
 These variables have been collected for the period of three years before and three years after the 
takeover completion year, taking into consideration the fiscal year end of the sample firms. 
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- Change in control firm workforce (in the employment equation), where the control firm is 
selected on the basis of industry, size and pre-event performance criteria, as recommended by 
Barber and Lyon (1996)
8
;  
- Change in industry average wage (in the wage equation), calculated as the change in industry-
median wage rate;  
- Relative size, which is the ratio of acquiring firm size to the transaction value (target firm size). 
Previous research shows that larger firms pay higher wages, because they hire higher quality 
workers (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and McGuckin and Nguyen 
(1995) confirm that the effect of mergers is different for small and large firms: in small firms 
wages rise more quickly than wage rise in large acquirers;  
- Leverage, which is the debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the takeover completion year; 
- Board ownership; prior research argues that Board ownership reduces agency problems and 
induces managers to make shareholder value maximizing decisions (Cosh et al., 2006). Lewellen 
                                                 
8
 For each acquired and acquiring firm we select a matching firm at the end of year t-1 on the 
basis of the methodology recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996): first, we filter all firms in 
the same industry with the sample firm; second, we select all firms within the 25% to 200% size 
interval of the sample firm’s size, size being measured by total assets; third, we select the non-
acquiring firm with the closest operating performance measure (EBITA scaled by total assets) to 
the matching firm. In addition to this, the matched firm should not be involved in major mergers 
or acquisitions two years before the sample takeover year and three years after the sample 
takeover year. 
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et al.(1985) conclude that takeovers initiated by directors with small ownership are more likely to 
have negative bidder stock returns;  
- Relatedness dummy regressor, which takes 1 if both target and acquiring firms are in the same 
industry and 0 otherwise. Prior research suggests that the scope for synergy, and subsequent 
value created by mergers, differs depending on the relatedness of merging businesses. In related 
mergers there are more opportunities for achieving a greater level of cost savings by eliminating 
duplicative activities (Rumelt, 1974);  
- Hostility dummy regressor, which takes 1 if the management of the target company rejects the 
initial offer made by any acquirer and 0 otherwise; Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that the 
rent transfer hypothesis is especially true in the case of hostile takeovers.  
- Cash paid dummy regressor, which takes 1 if all payments are made with cash and 0 otherwise; 
Franks et al. (1988) show that premiums are higher in cash acquisitions than in equity 
acquisitions. At the same time, the payment means provides the market with some information 
about the quality of the mergers: prior research shows that in cash acquisitions shareholders’ 
long-term abnormal gains do not differ from zero, while in equity acquisitions shareholders incur 
significant abnormal losses (Franks et al., 1988; Bhagat et al., 1990).  
To test hypotheses Q2-H2 and Q2-H4, we estimate the following model:  
  ControlX Premium1        (2) 
where Premium is the excess of bid price over share price one month prior to takeover 
announcement, and other variables are as explained above.   
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To test hypotheses Q2-H5 and Q2-H6, we estimate the following model:  
  ControlBHARX 1         (3) 
where BHAR is long-run share price abnormal returns for acquiring firm shareholders, and other 
variables are as explained above.   
1.3.2 Data and measuring post-merger changes in workforce and wages 
This chapter uses the same sample and data as described in Chapter 5. Similarly, post-merger 
changes in the workforce and wages are measured using the same technique as described in 
Chapter 5.    
1.3.3 Measuring shareholders’ short- and long-run abnormal returns 
To measure target firm shareholders’ gains, we use two measures: takeover premium and target 
firm shareholders’ abnormal share price returns around takeover announcement dates. A one-
month premium is usually used to control for the rumours about takeovers and to determine the 
true size of the premium. As in other studies, this variable is defined as the difference between 
the purchase price and the 30 day pre-takeover price divided by the 30 day pre-takeover price. 
We use daily stock price return data for the calculation of short-term abnormal returns and 
monthly stock price return data for that of long-term abnormal returns. To estimate short-run 
abnormal gains, daily returns are calculated using Stock Returns Index data, downloaded from 
Datastream. For this purpose, for both targets and bidders, 300 daily Stock Return Indexes for 
both target and buyer firms have been downloaded around the takeover announcement date: 294 
days before the announcement date and 5 days after the announcement date. Similarly, FTSE All-
Share Index figures for 300 days have been downloaded for each takeover’s announcement dates. 
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Consistent with the previous research, daily stock returns from -300 days to -60 days have been 
used to estimate market model parameters and to calculate the variance for abnormal returns.  
To calculate long-term abnormal returns we use the monthly stock price returns of 
acquiring firms for the period t+36 months. For this purpose, for each acquirer the monthly stock 
return index for the period of 37 months following the takeover completion month has been 
downloaded from Datastream. Similarly, for each matching firm (selected on the basis of 
industry, size and performance) the corresponding 37 monthly return index figures have been 
downloaded. 
We estimate short-run stock price abnormal returns using CAR calculation methodology, 
and long-run abnormal returns using BHAR methodology, described in Chapter 4. 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Univariate analysis of post-takeover changes in workforce and wages 
Table 2 reports the percentage changes in workforce and wages during post-takeover years 
relative to the pre-takeover year, controlling for the workforce and wage changes in the matched 
firms, using the Brown and Medoff (1988) regression methodology. We ran separate regressions 
for each dummy regressor (all takeovers, hostile, related, cash-paid and employee layoff-making 
takeovers). The table only provides the coefficients of the relevant dummy variables, without 
reporting the coefficients of pre-takeover wage and employment variables. 
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Table 1 Post-takeover percentage change in workforce and wages 
Post-takeover years t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3
Panel A: Change in employment relative to the pre-takeover level
All takeovers - 0.123*** - 0.032* - 0.013 - 0.009
Related takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.041* - 0.007 0.027
Unrelated takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.025 - 0.05 - 0.078
Hostile takeovers - 0.153*** - 0.062* - 0.06 0.036
Friendly takeovers - 0.119*** - 0.026 - 0.006 - 0.013
Cash financed takeovers - 0.124*** - 0.056 - 0.027 0.024
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.122*** - 0.026 - 0.012 - 0.026
Panel B: Change in wage rate relative to the pre-takeover level
All takeovers - 0.006 - 0.012 0.019* 0.033**
Related takeovers - 0.01 0.002 0.014 0.032*
Unrelated takeovers - 0.005 0.033*** 0.031** 0.039**
Hostile takeovers - 0.027* 0.044** 0.029 0.047*
Friendly takeovers - 0.001 0.005 0.018 0.031**
Cash financed takeovers 0.031*** 0.001 0.008 0.028
Non-cash financed takeovers - 0.018** 0.019* 0.025* 0.035**   The 
above mean percentage changes were calculated on the basis of Brown and Medoff (1988), which estimates percentage changes, 
controlling for the lagged variables, on the basis of the following equation:  
   



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,        (2) 
where X indicates the logarithm of average wages per employee per annum in the merging firms and control firms in the wage 
equation and the logarithm of number of employees in the merging and control firms in the employment equation; t  is the 
takeover completion year;  3,2,1j , i.e. post-takeover years, W indicates the logarithm of average wages per employee per 
annum, E indicates the logarithm of number of workers;  3,2,1  tttk , i.e. pre-takeover years; D is a merger 
dummy variable, which takes 1 for merging firms and 0 for control firms. In this regression the dummy variable coefficient 
indicates the mean wage (or employment) growth for merging firms, comparing the wage (employment) growth in merging firms 
with the wage (employment) growth in non-merging control firms. In addition, models also include year and industry dummies in 
addition to pre-takeover levels of employment and wage. The estimation method is the Ordinary Least Square estimation method. 
In these regressions a newspaper information-based layoff dummy variable is used.  
Panel A reports the employment effect of takeovers. During the transaction completion year all 
takeovers reduce the workforce by 12% and by 3.2% one year after mergers. However, in the 
second and third post-takeover years the change in employment levels is not significantly 
different from the employment growth in non-merging control firms. Both related and unrelated 
acquisition show a 12% decline during the merger year and related mergers result in a 4.1% 
lower workforce growth in comparison to non-merging firms during the first post-takeover year. 
In contrast, the results show that hostile takeovers reduce employment levels more than friendly 
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takeovers do. During the merger year hostile takeovers reduce employment by about 15%, while 
friendly mergers reduce employment by 12%. Furthermore, hostile acquisitions reduce 
employment by 6% during the first post-takeover year. Conyon et al. (2001) suggest that this 
steep decline in employment levels should not lead to the view that hostile takeovers destroy 
jobs, as their results show that, after controlling for the pre-takeover wage, employment and 
output variables, this distinctive effect of takeovers disappears. This indicates that the significant 
decline in employment in the case of hostile takeovers is the result of output decline, possibly due 
to high levels of divestments after such takeovers. The results show that the employment effect of 
cash-financed takeovers does not differ from the employment effect of non-cash-financed 
takeovers. 
Panel B reports the wage effects of takeovers. The results show that takeovers lead to 
higher levels of wage growth than is the case in non-merging firms. For the full sample, the 
results indicate that wages rise by 1.9% after two years and 3.3% after three years, indicating that 
employees in the merged firms earn higher wages on average than in the case of no merger. 
Unrelated acquisitions cause higher wage growth than related mergers: although the signs of the 
related merger coefficients are positive for all three years, the increase is only significant in the 
third year, while for unrelated mergers they are significant in all three years. After unrelated 
mergers employees earn about 3-4% higher wages on average than if mergers did not occur. 
After hostile takeovers employees earn about 4-5% higher wages than they would earn in the case 
of no merger, while friendly mergers cause 3% wage growth during the third post-takeover year. 
The results show that during post-takeover years non-cash-financed acquisitions increased wages 
2-3.5% faster than non-merging firms, while wages after cash-financed acquisitions do not differ 
from wages in non-merging firms.  
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The above simple percentage change in workforce and wages during post-takeover years 
shows no support for the rent transfer hypothesis: post-takeover employment growth does not 
differ much from workforce growth in control firms, while wage growth is higher in acquiring 
firms in comparison to wage growth in control firms. Although the results of the above 
regressions are informative, these models do not control for the effect of output changes and 
other relevant variables. It is still possible that there may be a negative relationship between 
shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions. Specifically, higher shareholder gains may 
be associated with lower growth in wages and employment, after controlling for other relevant 
variables. The next section investigates this association.  
1.4.2 Evidence on the rent transfer hypothesis 
Univariate analysis of shareholders’ short-run abnormal returns 
To investigate the association between shareholder gains and employee wealth concessions, first 
we calculate CARs for 11 days (5 days before the announcement date and 5 days after the 
announcement date), for 3 days (1 day before the announcement date and 1 day after the 
announcement date) and for the announcement date alone. Table 3 reports the mean CARs for 
both acquiring and acquired firms and associated t-statistics for the full sample as well as for the 
WFR and WFG sub-samples.  
Panel A reports the market model estimates. In the full sample target firm shareholders 
gain significant abnormal returns, whereas acquiring firm shareholders’ wealth does not change 
significantly. On the takeover announcement date target shareholders gain on average 17%, 
which increases up to 25% within the 11 days surrounding takeover announcement. On the 
takeover announcement date acquirers gain small negative abnormal returns, which are 
significant at 10% level only. Both the magnitude and significance of the CARs are generally 
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consistent with the previous research: for example, Franks et al. (1992) report a 23.3% total 
abnormal return for the announcement month. 
The results show that although target firm shareholders in both WFR and WFG sub-
samples earn positive significant abnormal returns, in the former case their gains are 3-5% lower 
than in the latter case. In contrast, the WFG acquirers earn very small and insignificant positive 
abnormal returns, while the WFR sub-sample acquirers earn significantly negative CARs during 
the 3-day and 1-day event windows
9
.  
                                                 
9
 The results are similar when we divide the full sample into workforce growth and workforce 
reduction sub-samples using the employment change during a 1-year period after takeovers.  
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Table 2 Short-run takeover announcement returns to acquired and acquiring firm shareholders 
CARs t-stat CARs t-stat CARs t-stat
Panel A: Market Model
Full sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1652 11.37 0.2158 14.32 0.2519 15.59
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0043 -1.39 -0.0044 -0.94 0.0106 0.96
The WFG sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.2009 8.26 0.2401 10.09 0.2784 12.01
Bidder firms mean CARs 0.0006 0.10 0.0064 0.79 0.0090 0.92
The WFR sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1578 7.95 0.2096 9.78 0.2442 9.69
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0088 -2.11 -0.0127 -1.95 0.0171 0.80
Panel B: Market Adjusted Model
Full sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1647 11.36 0.2145 14.12 0.2485 15.32
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0048 -1.54 -0.0056 -1.22 0.0074 0.67
The WFG sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.2003 8.29 0.2374 9.94 0.2726 11.72
Bidder firms mean CARs 0.0001 0.01 0.0037 0.46 0.0032 0.35
The WFR sub-sample
Target firms mean CARs 0.1576 7.92 0.2092 9.65 0.2408 9.55
Bidder firms mean CARs -0.0090 -2.17 -0.0129 -1.99 0.0141 0.65
Days (-5;+5)Days (-1;+1)Day 0
Event Windows
Not
es: This table reports the mean values of CARs and relevant t-statistics. There are 140 observations in the WFR sub-sample and 
95 observations in the WFG sub-sample.  
Panel B reports the market-adjusted model estimates of CARs, which are very similar to the 
above discussed market model estimates. Under both models, acquisitions involving layoffs 
produce negative short-run abnormal returns for acquirer shareholders. Market efficiency implies 
that news regarding a firm’s earnings should quickly reflect in its share price. Ball and Brown 
(1968) show that an unexpected change in future expected earnings causes rapid changes in share 
prices. Employee layoff announcements may also provide new information to the market about 
the expected changes in earnings. In this respect, announcement of layoffs involving takeovers 
may reveal a decline in earnings and therefore markets will negatively adjust prices to take 
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account of this new information. Consistent with this, the results show that workforce reducing 
acquirers earn negative short-run abnormal returns on takeover announcement.  
Several points emerge from this analysis. First, these results do not support the value-
redistribution theory of takeovers: according to this theory shareholders should have earned 
higher abnormal returns after acquisitions that involve employee layoffs than after acquisitions 
that do not. The above results show the opposite of this prediction: in acquisitions involving 
layoffs for both target and bidder, shareholders earn lower gains than in acquisitions that do not. 
Secondly, the results suggest that markets correctly forecast employee layoffs for certain types of 
acquisitions, and negatively react to the announcement of such events. Previous research shows 
that on takeover announcement acquirers’ wealth does not change (Andrade and Stafford, 2004). 
The results of this chapter not only confirm this conclusion, but also show that firms making 
layoffs earn significant negative abnormal returns at the time of the takeover announcement. 
These results suggest that on announcement of a takeover markets distinguish layoff-making 
acquisitions from those acquisitions that do not make employee layoffs. Thus, the results support 
the market efficiency hypothesis, given the fact that employee layoffs may occur well after 
takeovers
10
.  
Finally, prior research shows that the short-run market reaction to layoff announcements 
is negative in general, as markets consider such events as reactions to poor operating performance 
(Hillier et al., 2007). However, prior research also suggests that market reactions to employee 
layoffs should depend on the underlying reasons for such events, the information provided to 
                                                 
10
 Some takeover announcements include information about future expected redundancies. 
However, it is in managers’ interests to minimise such information about negative labour effects 
of mergers.     
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investors and pre-layoff performance: layoffs undertaken to respond to adverse market effects 
should generate a negative market reaction, while layoffs undertaken to improve efficiency 
should cause a positive market reaction (Elayan et al., 1998). Chen et al. (2001) also show that 
markets react negatively to layoffs caused by product demand decline, but react positively to 
efficiency improvement layoffs. The Hillier et al. (2007) results indicate that layoffs following 
poor operating performance generate more negative market reaction than layoffs caused by 
restructuring or cost cutting. In this regard, negative market reactions to layoff-involving 
acquisitions suggest that markets consider such acquisitions as reactions to adverse market 
conditions.   
Multivariate regression analysis 
Managers may cut costs not only by dismissing employees, but also by reducing wages or 
slowing wage growth. Therefore we use two variables as the dependent variables in the multiple 
regressions: change in workforce and wages
11
. Prior theoretical research suggests that wages and 
employment growth may be different in related versus unrelated, hostile versus friendly and cash-
financed versus non-cash-financed mergers. Therefore we also use relatedness, hostility, cash-
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 However, we do not use the wage change variable as the explanatory variable in the 
employment equation and the employment change variable in the wage equation. The reason is 
that when we included employment change in the wage equations, the results showed that there 
was a significant negative relationship between wage growth and employment growth. However, 
the regression diagnostics indicate that there may be some specification error with that model, as 
the F-value for the RESET test is very high and the p-value is low. Therefore in wage equations 
we report the models excluding the employment change variable and in the employment 
equations we report the models that exclude the wage change variable.       
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financed and employee layoff dummy regressors and their interactions with CARs and the 
premium.  
Table 4 reports the regression results for the employment equations. The sign of the first 
main variable of interest – CARs – is positive and it becomes significant in the model which 
includes dummy regressors and their interactions with the CARs. One unit increase in CARs 
would cause 0.34% higher employment growth in unrelated (friendly and non-cash) acquisitions. 
In contrast, in related acquisitions, one unit increase in CARs would cause 0.02% [= 0.336 – 
0.357] lower employment growth. 
While the premium is not associated with post-takeover workforce change, its interaction 
with the relatedness dummy variable is significant and negative, implying that in related 
acquisitions a one percentage point increase in the premium would cause a 0.1% [= 0.177 – 
0.273] reduction in employment growth. This is consistent with the view that acquirers pay a 
higher premium for the targets that create more synergy (for example, in the form of steeper 
decline in labour demand). The Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and McGuckin and Nguyen 
(2001) results show that firms acquire better-performing firms, which may require a high 
premium
12
. The interactions of other dummies with the premium are not significant, suggesting 
that the effect of paying a high premium on employment is the same in hostile versus friendly 
and cash-paid versus non-cash acquisitions.  
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 If post-merger business growth opportunities are high, providing high expected cash flows, 
then it is reasonable to assume that some of the cash flows should accrue to target firm 
shareholders, enabling them to earn a high takeover announcement gain. 
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Table 3: Regressions of post-takeover workforce change on target firm shareholders’ gains 
(abnormal returns and premium).  
 
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Target CAR 0.146 0.336**
Change in acquirers' operating performance 0.025 0.065 0.028 - 0.031
Change in control firm workforce 0.128*** 0.105*** 0.129*** 0.113***
Relative size - 0.034** - 0.037* - 0.043*** - 0.044**
Leverage - 0.602*** - 0.678*** - 0.644*** - 0.612***
Board ownership 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005**
Relatedness 0.205** 0.273***
Hostility - 0.025 0.123
Cash paid - 0.123 - 0.212**
Relatedness · CAR - 0.357*
Hostility · CAR 0.158
Cash paid· CAR 0.067
Premium - 0.010 0.177
Relatedness · Premium - 0.273*
Hostility · Premium - 0.190
Cash paid · Premium 0.254
Constant 0.138 0.082 0.187** 0.034
F -statistic 12.84 8.01 11.10 5.79
Adjusted R-square 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.18
Number of observations 182 180 187 183 Not
es: The dependent variable is post-takeover workforce change. The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the 
variables. 
The sign of the relative size variable is negative. This suggests that the acquirers that buy large 
firms slow down further firm size growth during post-takeover years. Similarly, high leverage 
inversely affects workforce growth. The results imply that 1% point higher leverage causes 0.6% 
lower employment growth. The Board ownership variable has a positive coefficient, which is 
significant at the 0.01% level. These results suggest that higher ownership by boards  lead to 
faster employment growth, possibly due to business growth resulting from better strategic 
management: one percentage point higher board ownership causes 0.8% higher employment 
growth during the post-takeover years. Finally, as expected, control firm workforce change is 
positively associated with acquirers’ workforce growth.  
The estimation results of the wage equations are given in Table 5. Model 1 shows that 
targets’ CARs do not explain post-takeover wage change. However, model 2 indicates a negative 
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and significant slope coefficient for the cash-paid dummy and the CAR interaction term
13
. This 
indicates that, consistent with the rent transfer argument, in cash acquisitions a one unit increase 
in CARs would result in 0.13% [= 0.013 – 0.138] lower wage growth14. In non-cash acquisitions 
CARs do not explain post-takeover wage growth. At the same time there is no significant 
difference in the association between CARs and wage growth in related versus unrelated 
acquisitions and hostile versus friendly acquisitions.   
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 In the models that include interaction terms we do not interpret the lower level variable 
coefficients, because they only provide limited information. For example, in model 2, a 
significant cash-paid dummy variable would indicate that wage growth is 5.5% higher in cash-
paid acquisitions than in non-cash acquisitions, but ???only when CARs are equal to zero. 
However, in reality CARs are rarely equal to zero. Therefore we only interpret the coefficients of 
the interaction terms.    
14
 The effect of this variable is calculated taking into consideration the main effect and the 
interaction term effect.  
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Table 4: Regression of post-takeover wage growth on target firm shareholders’ gains (abnormal 
returns and premium). 
 
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
Target CAR 0.017 0.013
Change in acquirers' operating performance 0.065 0.037 0.062 0.069
Change in industry average wage 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.176***
Relative size 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.013*
Leverage - 0.060 - 0.043 - 0.059 - 0.038
Board ownership - 0.002** - 0.002** - 0.002*** - 0.002***
Relatedness - 0.048* - 0.009
Hostility 0.024 0.067**
Cash paid 0.058* 0.048
Relatedness · CAR 0.112*
Hostility · CAR - 0.036
Cash paid· CAR - 0.138**
Premium 0.008 0.071**
Relatedness · Premium - 0.033
Hostility · Premium - 0.120**
Cash paid · Premium - 0.079
Constant 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.123*** 0.096***
F -statistic 3.76 2.61 3.77 3.43
Adjusted R-square 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
Number of observations 182 182 182 181 Not
es: The dependent variable is post-takeover wage change. The estimation method is OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 provides the definitions of the variables. 
 
Model 3 shows that the second variable of interest – premium – does not explain post-takeover 
wage growth. However, when the model includes dummy regressors and their interactions with 
the premium, the main effect of the premium variable becomes significant, indicating that in 
friendly (unrelated and non-cash) acquisitions a higher premium is associated with higher wage 
growth. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in premium leads to 0.07% higher wage 
growth in such acquisitions. At the same time, the slope coefficient of the interaction term 
between hostility dummy and premium is negative, meaning that in hostile acquisitions a one 
percentage point increase in premium would lead to 0.05% [0.071 – 0.120] lower wages. Other 
interaction terms indicate no differential effect of the CARs on wages in related versus unrelated 
and cash-paid versus non-cash acquisitions. 
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The control variables behave as expected. Wage growth in acquiring firms is strongly 
related to the industry-wide wage changes. The greater the acquired company size relative to the 
size of the acquiring company, the higher the wage growth, which is consistent with previous 
research that suggests that larger firms pay higher wages (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Moreover, 
high leverage inversely affects wage growth, as indicated by the negative coefficient. The results 
on the association between Board ownership and wages confirm the Pagano and Volpin (2005) 
model predictions: higher ownership by Boards lead to lower levels of wage growth
15
.  
In sum, the results in general do not support the predictions of the value-redistribution 
hypothesis, except on the following points, which provide partial support for this hypothesis. 
First, higher CARs are associated with wage cuts, when acquisitions are made with cash 
payments. Secondly, a higher premium is associated with wage cuts, when acquisitions are 
hostile in nature. Thus, the effect of hostile takeovers on wage growth is distinguishable from the 
effect of friendly takeovers, as predicted with the rent transfer argument. This evidence shows 
that in hostile takeovers where a high premium is paid the rent allocated to labour (in the form of 
lower wages) is less favourable than in the case of friendly takeovers.  
At the same time, higher CARs and premiums are associated with slower workforce 
growth in related acquisitions. However, we argue that this evidence does not suggest rent 
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 When the model is in log – level form (i.e. the dependent variable in the logarithm form and 
the independent variable in the level form (could be in percentage or proportions), one unit 
change in the independent variable indicates a percentage change in the dependent variable, 
where the direction and magnitude of the change IS???given by the coefficient of the independent 
variable. For example, the CAR variable is entered into the model in decimal form. The Board of 
ownership is entered in percentage form. 
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transfer. Specifically, slower workforce growth in related acquisitions does not necessarily 
facilitate rent transfer by making high levels of employee workforce reductions, but indicates 
higher levels of synergy realization after such acquisitions. For other types of acquisitions 
(friendly or non-cash-paid) there is a positive association which contradicts the predictions of the 
rent transfer hypothesis. 
In sum, the results do not support the rent transfer argument: in most cases targets’ CARs 
and labour rent are positively related. In the next section, we investigate the validity of the rent 
sharing argument by investigating the association between long-run shareholder gains and post-
takeover wage and employment growth. 
1.4.3 Evidence on the rent sharing hypothesis 
Univariate analysis of acquiring firm shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns 
This section investigates whether shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns are different in the 
WFR and WFG sub-samples. Table 6 reports the long-term share price performance of acquiring 
firms in comparison to that of non-merging firms for the period of 12, 24 and 36 months 
following the takeover completion month. The long-run stock price abnormal returns are 
computed on the basis of BHAR methodology using industry, size and pre-takeover 
performance-matched firms
16
. 
Consistent with previous research, the results indicate that during the post-takeover 12 
months acquiring firms earn 6% less than their matching firms and this underperformance 
increases to 24% in a 36-month period. Thus, the full sample results indicate that an average 
acquirer shareholder’s wealth significantly declines during post-takeover years. The results of 
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 The results of the Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) approach are given in the 
Appendix.  
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this analysis confirm the ‘under-performance’ puzzle, documented by the existing empirical 
research (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). For example, on the basis of the BHAR approach using size 
and B/M matched firms, Conn et al. (2005) report that in the period of 36 post-takeover months 
domestic public firm acquisitions result in significantly negative returns of 20 %.  
Table 5 Long-run shareholder wealth effect of takeovers   
BHAR t-stat BHAR t-stat BHAR t-stat
Full sample acquirers' BHAR -0.0616 -1.84 -0.1970 -3.41 -0.2361 -2.42
The WFG sub-sample acquirers' BHAR -0.0182 -0.31 -0.0174 -0.20 0.0488 0.32
The WFR sub-sample acquirers' BHAR -0.0798 -1.69 -0.2269 -2.81 -0.2938 -2.19
12 months 24 months 36 months
Event Windows
 
Notes: This table reports the mean values of BHARs and relevant t-statistics. There are 140 observations in the WFR sub-sample 
and 95 observations in the WFG sub-sample.        
Further analysis reveals that there is a clear difference in the long-run stock price performance of 
the WFG and WFR sub-sample acquirers, indicating that much of the underperformance could be 
linked to the employee layoff-making acquirers. The WFG acquirers’ performance does not 
significantly differ from the non-merging firms’ performance. In contrast, the WFR acquirers 
earn 8% less after 12 months, 22% less after 24 months and 29% less after 36 months in 
comparison to the non-merging firms. 
Thus post-takeover employee workforce reductions could be suggested as one explanation 
for the acquiring firms’ long-run ‘under-performance’ puzzle. On the one hand, these results 
imply that those acquirers who make excessive employee layoffs earn significant negative 
abnormal returns, because such layoffs may destroy human resource capital of acquired firms. On 
the other hand, the results suggest that acquirers may layoff employees after performance 
deterioration. Although there is a large body of literature on the market reaction to employee 
layoff announcements, only a few studies have analysed long-run abnormal returns after 
employee layoffs. Chen et al. (2001) report that although layoff-making firms’ prior performance 
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is poor, during the post-layoff period their share price returns are not different from market 
returns. In contrast, Hillier et al. (2007) report significant long-run share price underperformance 
for employee layoff-making firms.   
Multivariate regression analysis 
Both short and long-run univariate analyses indicate that the WFR acquirers’ wealth declines 
significantly, while the WFG acquirers’ wealth does not change much. This section investigates 
whether these variations in acquirers’ abnormal returns explain changes in workforce and wages, 
using the multiple regression analysis that controls for other relevant variables.  
The regression results are given in Table 7. The results show a strong positive association 
between workforce changes and long-run abnormal returns
17
. This positive association implies 
that the lower the shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns, the greater the employment 
reductions. For example, model 1 shows that a one point lower BHAR causes a 0.10% higher 
employment reduction. Model 2 indicates that in cash-paid acquisitions the regression slope is 
significantly smaller than the regression slope for the non-cash acquisitions. In cash-paid 
acquisitions, a one percentage point increase in BHAR would lead to 0.003% [= 0.116 – 0.113] 
higher employment growth.  
Both relative size and leverage is inversely related to employment growth. Acquiring 
larger firms slows down further workforce growth during the three years after takeovers. 
Similarly, high levels of debt negatively affect firm growth. In contrast to this, higher ownership 
by Boards leads to accelerated growth, possibly due to the better operating performance of 
management.   
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 As there is a high correlation between the layoff dummy variable and the employment change 
variable, these models exclude the layoff dummy variable.  
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Table 6 Regression of post-takeover wage and workforce change on shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns.  
Dependent variable
Independent variables model1 model2 model3 model4
BHAR 0.099*** 0.116*** 0.022*** 0.032**
Change in control firm workforce 0.172*** 0.130***
Change in industry average wage 0.237*** 0.209***
Relative size - 0.041*** - 0.057*** 0.011* 0.010
Leverage - 0.645*** - 0.769*** - 0.055 - 0.083
Board ownership 0.008*** 0.009*** - 0.002** - 0.001
Relatedness 0.059 - 0.014
Hostility - 0.022 0.005
Cash paid - 0.089* 0.007
Relatedness · BHAR 0.024 - 0.010
Hostility · BHAR 0.020 0.003
Cash paid · BHAR - 0.113*** - 0.009
Constant 0.194** 0.205*** 0.116*** 0.114***
F -statistic 17.45 9.61 10.19 3.69
Adjusted R-square 0.29 0.36 0.16 0.13
Number of observations 180 176 183 183
Wage changeEmployment change
Not
es: The dependent variables are post-takeover workforce change and wage change. The estimation method is OLS, using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980). Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Appendix 9.2 
provides the definitions of the variables. 
  
These results are consistent with the previous research. For example, Cascio et al. (1997) report a 
significant positive association between stock returns and employment change, interpreting this 
as evidence that firms with employment growth produce higher abnormal returns during the three 
years after the workforce adjustment.  
Model 3 shows that wage growth is positively associated with acquirers’ long-run stock 
price abnormal returns, implying that a one point increase in BHARs leads to 0.02% higher wage 
growth. Acquiring firms’ wage growth is positively associated with industry wage growth. 
Acquiring larger firms also leads to faster wage growth. This is consistent with the previous 
research which shows that larger firms pay higher wages. Board ownership is inversely related to 
wage growth.  
Model 4 reports the differential wage growth effect of different types of takeovers. The 
significant main coefficient for BHAR and non-significant coefficients for its interactions with 
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the related, hostile and cash-paid dummies indicate that this variable is positively associated with 
wage growth in the absence of such conditions.  
In brief, the results show that there is a significant positive relationship between acquirers’ 
long-run abnormal returns and changes in both workforce and wage growth. This suggests that 
takeovers which benefit shareholders also benefit employees: employees can have higher rent 
from improved performance. This strong relationship between post-takeover wage growth and 
long-run shareholder abnormal returns is consistent with the rent sharing between different 
stakeholders. Thus, in the case of successful mergers, the resulting efficiency improvements 
benefit both groups of stakeholders: employees and shareholders.          
1.5 Discussion 
Two points form the basis for the rejection of the hypotheses that acquired firm shareholders’ 
gains (CARs and premium) negatively affect post-takeover employment (Q3-H1 and Q3-H2). 
First, the WFG sub-sample firms gain higher takeover announcement abnormal returns than the 
WFR sub-sample firms. Second, the regressions show that target firm shareholders’ CARs are 
positively associated with post-takeover workforce change, while the premium is positively 
associated with wage growth.  
Similarly, the results reject the hypotheses that acquired firm shareholders’ gains (CARs 
and premium) negatively affect post-takeover wage growth (Q3-H3 and Q3-H4) in friendly 
mergers. In contrast to the predictions, target firm shareholders’ gains (both CARs and premium) 
do not explain post-takeover wage change. First, wage growth in the merging firms is higher than 
in non-merging firms. Second, the regressions show no significant (negative) association between 
target firm shareholder gains and wage growth. In sum, an analysis of short-run shareholder 
wealth shows that, although there is some support for the rent transfer hypothesis in hostile and 
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cash-financed acquisitions, the evidence is more consistent with the argument for rent sharing 
between shareholders and employees in friendly mergers.  
However, we fail to reject the hypotheses that acquirers’ long-run abnormal returns are 
positively associated with post-takeover workforce and wage growth (Q3-H5 and Q3-H6). In the 
long run the WFG sub-sample acquirers earn zero abnormal returns, while the WFR sub-sample 
acquirers underperform. The regressions show a strong positive association between acquirers’ 
long-run abnormal returns and post-takeover workforce and wage changes. Thus, better 
performing firms do not make employee layoffs, while firm performance deterioration may lead 
to workforce reduction. This is consistent with the view that firm under-performance is one of the 
main factors that may lead to employee layoffs (Hillier et al., 2007). These results imply that if 
takeovers benefit shareholders, labour also gains from such transactions; if shareholders suffer 
from a takeover, labour also suffers from such transactions.  
We conclude that the evidence contradicts the rent transfer hypothesis, but it is consistent 
with an alternative explanation: takeovers affect both shareholders and employees in the same 
direction. We argue that employment growth and wage growth depend on the success of the 
mergers, measured by the long-run abnormal returns of acquiring firms. If BHAR is negative, 
then the employment change is negative, if BHAR is positive then the employment change is also 
positive. Thus, managers may act for the success of the companies, not only for the best interests 
of shareholders as discussed in Pendleton (2009). The results of this chapter imply that in LMEs 
the MCC does not negatively affect labour and therefore does not discourage long-run firm-
specific human capital investments.  
One of the limitations of using long-term analysis in assessing the effect of takeovers on 
shareholders and employment is that many other events may occur during this period, such as 
asset divestment and other acquisitions. Although we control for multiple acquisitions, it was not 
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possible to analyse the effect of divestments. Another possibility is that there may be reverse 
causality between share price changes and workforce changes. For example, Hillier et al. (2007) 
report that firms experience significant negative abnormal returns (-0.81%) after employee 
layoffs. However, it makes more sense to think that economic factors drive share prices, not that 
share prices lead to changes in economic factors. Thus, we assume that poor operating 
performance leads to stock price decline and then acquirers undertake employee layoffs to arrest 
further performance deterioration.  
1.6 Conclusions  
It has been suggested that takeovers may be motivated by the objective of wealth re-distribution 
from employees to shareholders. Specifically, Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that a 
considerable part of merger-related shareholder gains comes at the expense of employees, 
especially in hostile takeovers. Alternatively, post-takeover workforce and wage growth could be 
determined by the success of mergers. This chapter empirically investigates these competing 
views. In brief, the results support the view that managers act for the success of the company, 
balancing the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.   
The univariate regressions show that mergers and acquisitions do not change employment 
levels in the long run, although the immediate effect is negative, with steep job losses. The results 
also show that wages grow faster in merging firms than in non-merging firms. 
Next, the WFR sub-sample shareholder gains are smaller than the WFG sub-sample 
shareholder gains, which contradicts value-redistribution theory predictions. In particular, the 
WFR sub-group acquirers earn significantly negative abnormal returns, while the WFG sub-
group acquirers’ wealth does not change much. This suggests that the market can distinguish 
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acquisitions of bad targets, which may involve employee layoffs, from the acquisitions of good 
businesses with growth opportunities.  
To directly investigate the value-redistribution theory we regress target firm shareholders’ 
short-run abnormal returns and premium on post-takeover workforce and wage changes, 
controlling for other relevant variables. The results do not show that high shareholder gains 
(CARs and premium) cause subsequent workforce reductions and wage cuts. Instead, while a 
high premium is associated with faster pay rises, higher CARs are associated with employment 
growth. However, the results also show some evidence supporting the wealth transfer hypothesis: 
in cash acquisitions high CARs are associated with lower wage growth, while in hostile takeovers 
a high premium is associated with lower wage growth. At the same time, in related acquisitions a 
high premium leads to slower employment growth.     
The WFG sub-sample acquirers’ long-run share price performance does not differ from 
the non-merging firms’ performance, while the WFR sub-sample acquirers significantly 
underperform their non-merging matching counterparts. The regression results indicate a 
significant positive relationship between BHARs and post-takeover workforce changes as well as 
between BHARs and wage changes. This means that post-takeover workforce and wage changes 
depend on acquirers’ performance: if shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns are low, workforce 
growth and wage growth are low. Thus, wage growth does not depend on the rent expropriating 
behaviour of shareholders, but depends on how managers promote the success of their company. 
This means that if shareholders gain from takeovers, then employees earn higher salaries; if 
shareholders suffer from the acquisitions, then employees also suffer from them.  
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